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We investigate the influence of a judge’s objective function on the type of sanctions 
used for enforcing environmental standards. We focus on the difference between 
monetary and non-monetary penalties. Therefore, we examine the extent to which 
judges take social costs of sanctions into account when making judgments in court in 
the context of environmental violations. Furthermore, we conduct an empirical 
analysis to test the main findings of the theoretical model using court data from 
several Belgian jurisdictions. We find that besides minimizing environmental 
damages judges also take social costs of sanctions into account in their decision-
making. 
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I. Introduction 
The theory of regulatory enforcement lies at the crossroads of two disciplines: law and 
economics. When one interprets the economic view of enforcement in a judicial 
framework, it is apparent that both fields may yield different conclusions, simply 
because the objectives are different. On the one hand, economists generally argue that 
the basic tool of analysis is social welfare maximization and that all scarce resources 
need to be included in the objective function of the policy maker. This means that social 
costs of sanctions, such as transaction costs or fire sales due to liquidity constraints, are 
an indispensable part of a social welfare based cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, 
enforcers with a law background are mainly concerned by making society comply with 
regulations. Their principal decision criterion is the deterrence effect that regulatory 
measures bring about. It would be unfair, however, to state that legal scholars entirely 
disregard efficiency aspects of sanctions. The 'proportionality principle' and the 
'necessity criterion' state that sanctions should be such that the social costs for society 
are ‘in proportion’ to the seriousness of the committed violations as well as necessary to 
achieve the enforcement goal. At a European level, these principles are included among 
the legal criteria reflected in the principle of Community loyalty in Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty, from which the enforcement obligation of the member states derives (Meeus 
2007). Still, the question to what extent deterrence and cost-effectiveness are taken into 
account remains to be answered. In this paper, we investigate how the trade-off between 
environmental and social costs affects judges’ behavior in court. We develop a model to 
incorporate different specifications of his objective function: minimization of 
environmental damages only or, alternatively, minimization of all welfare costs, 
including both environmental damages and social costs of sanctions. We do this in a 
similar way as Keeler (1995) who analyzed the role of objectives in explaining the 
behavior of an environmental agency. He believed that in practice achieving compliance 
is a primary goal of the environmental regulator and that compliance costs to firms are 
only taken into account as a secondary concern. Our analysis, in contrast, focuses on 
judicial behavior in a civil law system and we investigate the interactions between 
sanctions imposed by the judge and firm's emission levels.  
We draw a general distinction between two types of sanctions: fines and non-monetary 
sanctions. Fines are generally thought to be the least costly enforcement instrument in   3
terms of social welfare (Becker 1968). However, more expensive non-monetary 
sanctions may provide additional benefits such as the fact that imprisonment makes 
recidivism (temporarily) impossible or that mandatory clean up orders or (temporary) 
closure of a polluting firm generally lead to a cleaner environment. We show that the 
more important the judge deems the social costs of sanctions; the less likely it is that 
firms are (temporarily) closed down as a consequence of an environmental offense. 
Further, in an empirical analysis of Belgian court cases, we try to assess which weights 
are given to the deterrence effects as well as to the social costs of sanctions for 
environmental violations. We find that judges take both environmental effects and 
social costs of sanctions into account in their decision-making in Flanders (Belgium), 
though the exact weights could not be determined.  
Imperfect compliance has been a debated topic over the last decades. The framework for 
the economic analysis of law breaking behavior was developed by Becker (1968). He 
considered law-breaking fines as equivalent to any other cost of doing business for a 
firm. Further, he concluded that fines have several advantages over other types of 
sanctions, since they require fewer productive resources and are therefore less costly to 
society. Afterwards, various topics related to firms' compliance decisions have been 
investigated
1. Previous empirical studies have mainly focused on administrative 
sanctioning through a regulatory agency (see, e.g. Nyborg & Telle 2006, Eckert 2004, 
Earnhart 1997 and Helland 2001), while the number of empirical studies on criminal 
sanctions is much more limited. An example in the common law tradition is Eaton et al. 
(2005), where the authors study the effect of seeking punitive damages on the course of 
tort claims at several decision points in the prosecution procedure. Our approach is more 
similar to Rousseau & Billiet (2005) who analyze the fines imposed at trial in the civil 
law tradition, namely by the Court of Appeal in Ghent between 1990 and 2000. They 
determined the influence of offense and offender characteristics on the level of the 
penalty imposed for environmental offenses. 
The economic literature on judicial decision making has been scarce for a long time. As 
mentioned by Posner (1993), this followed from the fact that the judicial system is 
designed to remove economic incentives from judges’ behavior. Thus, the strategic 
                                                 
1 For a general overview of the literature on imperfect compliance in environmental economics, we refer 
to Cohen (1999). Also, Polinsky & Shavell (2000) made a comprehensive study on the welfare analysis of 
law enforcement. An overview of previous empirical studies on the enforcement of environmental 
regulations is discussed in Rousseau (forthcoming).   4
issues involved could impair judicial objectivity. Posner (1993) was the first to state that 
behavior of judges can be examined using a rationality-based framework, just like 
analyzing the behavior of “ordinary people”. Since then, a significant body of 
theoretical research has been developed to understand judicial behavior at a trial. For an 
US based overview of the ‘strategic’ approach to judicial decision making, we refer to 
Spiller & Gely (2007). Daughety & Reinganum (2000) model the way in which the 
available evidence is aggregated into a single judgment. Rasmusen (1993) and Levy 
(2003) developed models to investigate the importance of respecting judicial precedent 
in achieving legitimacy and in explaining judges’ behavior. However, theoretical 
models of judicial objectives have only rarely been developed for judging 
environmental cases (for an example, see Rousseau & Billiet 2005). Moreover, most 
studies previously mentioned have been developed in a common law context. It is not 
clear how the results concerning e.g. the importance of judicial precedence carry over to 
our civil law context. Fon & Parisi (2006) state that judicial precedent can be an 
important component of judicial decision making in civil law countries. Its influence 
depends on the requirement for consistency with previous case law. However, when 
judges have broad discretionary freedom, the rule of precedence becomes virtually 
unimportant. As a case in point, judges have this type of discretionary freedom when 
deciding on the type and level of sanction in criminal cases in Belgium, which allows us 
to disregard the rule of precedence. This conclusion is corroborated by a recent study by 
Monsieurs et al. (2009) who surveyed Belgian judges and find that the influence of 
judicial precedent is indeed very limited for Belgian courts. Judges state that they 
sometimes (54%) or rarely (24%) take decisions by fellow judges into account when 
making sanctioning decisions. 
In section II, we present the theoretical analysis of a firm-regulator interaction model. 
Next, in section III the empirical analysis tests the theoretical insights using trial data 
for environmental offenses in Flanders (Belgium). Section IV concludes. 
 
II. The model 
First we discuss the setup and the assumptions behind the model. Next, we address 
firms' compliance behavior and judges’ sanctioning decisions.   5
2.1 Assumptions 
Our static model studies the firm and judicial behavior, while taking the agency's 
behavior as given. An exogenously given environmental standard  X  is in place in order 
to limit firm emissions X. Emissions are related to firm activity levels; however, firms 
can use abatement technology in order to emit less
2. The abatement costs associated 
with reducing the level of emissions to X are denoted by  ( ) A X , with  ( ) '0 AX<  and 
( ) '' 0 AX > . The level of environmental damage caused by these emissions equals 
( ) DX with  ( ) 0 DX ′ > ,  ( ) '' 0 DX >  and  ( ) 00 D = . Further, we assume that the 
regulatory agency is perfectly informed about the marginal damage function of 
emissions, but imperfectly informed about firms' abatement costs. However, the 
regulatory agency can make an estimate about the average of these costs and the 
standard is set at the level which balances the average of marginal abatement costs with 
the marginal damage imposed on the environment. The agency monitors the standard 
and inspects the firm with a certain probability P. Since we focus on the sanctioning 
decision made by the judge, the environmental standard and the inspection rate are 
exogenously given. 
In case the firm is inspected and found to violate the standard, it is brought to court. 
Thus, we assume that the inspection probability is equal to the prosecution probability 
and disregard the possibility of measurement and judicial errors. The judge decides on 
his sanctioning strategy depending on the extent of the violation. Hence, we define a 
linear penalty function (see Arguedas 2008, Rousseau & Proost 2005, 2009): 
0
00
Fs XX f o r XX
for X X
⎡⎤ =− − ≥ ⎣⎦
=− <
 
with  () 0 FX X s ′ −= > ,  ( ) 0 FXX ′′ − =  and with s equal to the slope of the penalty 
function. Here, we define F as the monetary equivalent of the penalty imposed and 
argue that for each non-monetary sanction a monetary equivalent can be found which 
provides firms with the same compliance incentives. Further, the sanction is limited by 
                                                 
2 In the paper we model a representative firm and a representative judge. However, we assume that firms 
in the industry are heterogeneous with different production and abatement functions.   6
the wealth W of the firm, defined as the discounted value of all future incoming cash 
flows. Thus, we can represent the use of a warning by F=0 and firm closure by F=W. 
Next, we define the function  ( ) ( ) SC F X X − , with  ( ) ( ) 0 SC F X X ′ −>  and   
( ) ( ) 0 SC F X X ′′ −> , which represents the social costs entailed by the penalty imposed. 
We define social costs of sanctions as the sum of the burden inflicted on firms and the 
administrative costs for firms and government, in our case including courts and legal 
administrations. We assume that these social costs of sanctions increase convexly with 
the level of the fine, because of increasing transaction costs and more stringent liquidity 
constraints. Firstly, transaction costs are likely to rise because firms have higher 
incentives to oppose a verdict, possibly leading them to appeal the verdict, or to refuse 
to pay (high) fines. This leads to higher administrative costs for firms and government. 
Secondly, liquidity constrained firms will be hit harder by higher fines, possibly leading 
to fire sales, lay offs, etc. Furthermore, note that the social costs associated with firm 
closure vary over firms since the available wealth varies over firms. 
2.2 Firm and judicial behavior 
The model is solved using backward induction. Thus the optimal judicial sanctioning 
strategy takes the reaction function of firms into account. First, we determine the firm’s 
reaction functions, before turning attention to judicial behavior.  
2.2.1 Firm behavior 
A risk-neutral firm decides on the level of emissions X in order to minimize the sum of 
abatement costs plus the expected penalty. For a violator, the expected penalty equals 
the inspection probability P times the penalty ( ) . F . Thus the firm’s objective function 
is: 
  ( ) ( )
X MIN A X P F X X +⋅ −  
For an interior solution, the first order condition shows that the firm's optimal level of 




A XP P s
dX
−
−= = ⋅          (1)   7
Since the marginal sanction is equal to 0 as long as the firm is in compliance and 
() '0 AX −>  for all X, it is clear that the optimal emission level, denoted by  0 X , is 
larger than or equal to  X  in case of an interior solution. For a corner solution, we find 
that  0 XX =  minimizes the firm's costs associated with the environmental regulation.  
2.2.2 Judicial behavior 
We now specify the judge's objectives when penalizing violators of the environmental 
standard. Rousseau (forthcoming) discusses three important, yet distinct, objective 
functions
3 for the enforcing authority: i) social welfare maximization, ii) deterrence 
maximization and iii) providing justice.  Firstly, social welfare maximization implies 
that the regulator balances compliance costs with environmental damages. Thus, an 
equilibrium can only be obtained if the regulator chooses a penalty that equalizes the 
marginal expected violation costs to the marginal damages. This social welfare 
maximization objective implies a harm-based approach to environmental enforcement 
(Polinsky and Shavell, 1994) since the sanction imposed on violators is based on the 
harm caused by the violation. The socially optimal sanction also optimizes deterrence 
since all socially detrimental violations are averted. Secondly, maximizing deterrence 
implies that the costs associated with violating the rules should always be larger than 
the cost of compliance. In this gain-based approach, the avoided compliance cost acts 
then as an estimate of the gain to the violator of breaking the rules. Finally, an 
additional objective of punishment has been to provide justice. Justice has been 
approached in many different ways such as procedural justice, retributive justice and 
restorative justice.
4  
Rousseau (forthcoming) concludes that the currently available empirical studies looking 
at the determinants of the fines imposed for environmental offenses are inadequate to 
capture the objectives of judges and administrations with a sufficient level of 
confidence. Still, some general trends emerge: fines increase with the harm caused by 
the offense, for repeat offenders as well as for intentional offenses. Thus, previous 
                                                 
3 Firestone (2003) also examines these and other regulatory objectives for environmental enforcement. 
4 Procedural justice incorporates a theory of procedural fairness for civil dispute resolution (see Solum 
2004). The concept of retributive justice is based on the principle "Let the punishment fit the crime" such 
that the severity of the penalty for a violation should be reasonable and proportional to the severity of the 
infraction (see Zaibert 2006). Restorative justice, on the other hand, is concerned with making the victim 
whole and reintegrating the offender into society (see Braithwaite 2002).   8
studies provide some evidence of social welfare and justice concerns revealed by 
enforcers as well as a possible aversion to wrongfully convict defendants. 
In Flanders the judicial objectives are formally described by Van den Wyngaert (2006). 
This legal scholar states that the principal objectives for a judge when penalizing 
violators are to protect society from harm, to show that society disapproves of certain 
acts and to foster recovery from the harm done. In the context of environmental 
offenses, these elements are mainly related to reducing environmental harm and thus 
with maximizing deterrence and providing justice. However, Van den Wyngaert (2006) 
also states that judges should bear in mind that harmful consequences of sanctions 
should be limited. In addition, punishments should be in proportion to damages caused 
by offenses and the interests of all parties involved should be respected. These 
requirements imply that social costs of sanctions are considered and thus welfare might 
be maximized. We specify a parameter  [ ] 0,1 Ψ∈  reflecting the extent to which the 
judge takes the social costs of sanctions into account. We study judicial objectives for 
two extreme cases:   = 1 Ψ  and  0 Ψ = . If  = 1 Ψ , the judge behaves like a perfect 
welfare maximizer, taking all costs to all parties into account. If  0 Ψ = , the judge 
minimizes environmental harm or maximizes deterrence while ignoring the social costs 
of sanctions. Obviously, actual judicial behavior falls between these two extremes. 
The judicial objective function consists of three terms. A first term represents the 
environmental damages of exceeding the standard  X . A second component is the social 
costs of a sanction. These costs increase when a more stringent penalty is imposed, until 
the wealth constraint of the firm is reached. A third term is the additional compliance 
cost, when the firm is forced to reduce emissions up to a level  X . The parameter Ψ 
represents the extent to which the judge takes the second and third component into 
account. The judge can influence behavior by imposing a penalty F, subject to a firm's 
reaction function. The penalty increases with excess emissions  0 XX −  and with the 
marginal sanction s. Hence, the objective function is
5: 
() () () ( ) () () ( ) { } 00 0 s M I NDX DX S CFX X AX AX ⎡ ⎤ −+ Ψ − − − ⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
5 Note that we take the level of monitoring effort as given, so monitoring activities are not included in the 
judicial objective function.   9
Next we look at extreme cases for the parameter Ψ  by setting it equal to 0 or 1, since 
their analysis is useful as a benchmark.  
Case a:  1 Ψ=  
In this scenario, the judge's objective function includes all welfare costs associated with 
environmental violations and imposing sanctions. Since the firm's emission level equals 
0 X , the objective function is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )
1
00 0 s
M I N DX DX S CF X X AX AX
Ψ= ⎡ ⎤ −+ − − − ⎣ ⎦ 
Defining the optimal marginal penalty when  1 Ψ =  as  * s , the first order condition 
determining the optimal penalty  ( )
1 .* o Fs X X
Ψ= ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 0 '' SC F s F s X s D X s A X s ⎡ ⎤ ′′ ′ =− + ⎣ ⎦  
Thus, the optimal marginal penalty balances marginal costs and marginal benefits of 
increasing the sanction. A rise of the marginal sanction s increases firm's abatement 
efforts and thus decreases emissions, as shown in expression (1). The decreasing 
emissions have counteracting effects on damages and abatement costs and the overall 
impact depends on the initial amount emitted. 
Now we discuss when it is rational to impose a warning or to close a firm. Previously, 
we stated that these non-monetary sanctions are equivalent to imposing a zero fine 
(warning) or a fine equal to the firm’s entire wealth (firm closure). Thus it is optimal to 
impose a warning, if the marginal social costs of sanctions exceed the marginal benefits 
at all levels of s. This would be the case if marginal environmental damages are low, 
abatement costs for firms are high or marginal social costs of sanctions are high. In 
contrast, if marginal benefits of sanctioning are above marginal social sanctioning costs 
for all s, permanently closing down the firm becomes the appropriate sanction. Thus 
smaller firms face a higher risk of being closed down, because their wealth constraint is 
more often binding. 
Case b:  0 Ψ=  
The judge's objective function simplifies considerably when  0 Ψ =  and becomes:   10
( ) ( ) 0 s
MI N DX DX −  
The first order condition for the marginal fine s is then: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 00 '' 0 DXs X s ⋅ =  
We know that  ( )
' .0 D >  for all X and that  ( ) 0 '0 Xs <  in case of an interior solution for 
the firm's problem. Hence, the solution to the judge's minimization problem is to set the 
marginal fine sufficiently high to encourage all firms to comply, inducing a corner 
solution to the firm's cost minimization problem. However, since firms’ abatement cost 
functions are imperfectly known, a judge who wants to deter all possible violations has 
to impose a fine equal to the entire wealth of the firm, i.e. to close down all violating 
firms. So, in this extreme case, we find that 
0 FW
Ψ= =  for  XX >  and 
0 0 F
Ψ= =  for 
XX ≤ , with  ()
0 . F
Ψ=  representing the optimal penalty when  0 Ψ = . Thus, a judge who 
mostly cares about deterrence will impose more stringent sanctions than a judge who 
takes all welfare costs into account. Also, firms are closed down more often when the 
social costs of sanctions have little influence on the judicial decision.  
2.3 Summary of the theoretical analysis 
The theoretical analysis allows us to formulate testable hypotheses for the empirical 
analysis. Importantly, a deterrence maximizing judge is expected to be more severe and 
to impose more stringent sanctions for the same violation than a welfare maximizing 
judge. Further, the more a judge cares about the deterrence effect of sanctions, the more 
often the judge will close down offending firms. Also, a welfare maximizing judge 
might close down smaller firms more easily than larger firms, due to the effect of the 
wealth constraint. This last observation holds for all values of Ψ except at the corner 
case  0 Ψ= , in which case the judge would close down every violator. Thus we have: 
Hypothesis 1: A judge closes larger firms less often than smaller firms, if the judge 
takes the social costs of sanctions - to some extent - into account. 
Further, environmental damages are part of the objective functions for the welfare 
maximizing as well as the deterrence maximizing judge. This gives us:   11
Hypothesis 2: The stringency of sanctions is positively related to the seriousness of 
environmental damages. 
One can see that these hypotheses are related to the goal of achieving deterrence 
(hypothesis 2) in an efficient way (hypothesis 1). Finally, under specific circumstances, 
it may be optimal for a judge to impose a warning rather than imposing an actual 
sanction. Again, this conclusion holds for all values of Ψ except when Ψ = 0. 
 
III. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we test the hypotheses formulated in section 2.3 on environmental cases 
criminally prosecuted between 2003 and 2006 in Flanders (Belgium). First, we describe 
the dataset. Next, we discuss the estimation method and outline expected results.  
3.1 Data 
The database contains information on criminal sanctions for environmental violations 
imposed by the Courts of First Instance between 2003 and 2006 in seven judicial 
districts of the Flemish region in Belgium
6. We restrict ourselves to cases where the 
accused was a firm (excluding natural persons). Thus, we have 175 usable observations. 
We distinguish two dependent variables: NSANCTION and (LN)FINE. Firstly, the 
dummy variable NSANCTION indicates whether a non-monetary sanction was imposed 
and is equal to one if the offending firm was closed or if the damages caused had to be 
cleaned up by the offender. So the variable NSANCTION can be further decomposed 
into a variable representing (temporary) firm CLOSURE and one indicating a 
mandatory CLEANUP requirement. Secondly, the variable FINE equals the imposed 
monetary penalty. Since its distribution is strongly skewed to the right, a logarithmic 
transformation is applied to this variable, which is denoted LNFINE. Summary statistics 
of the dependent variables are given in Table I. 
The judge’s choice of the type of sanction (monetary versus non-monetary) was shown 
to depend on the sanction’s impact on environmental quality, on the social costs of 
sanctions and on firms’ abatement costs (D, SC and A). Moreover, the level of the 
                                                 
6 More information on the design of the database can be found in Billiet et al. (2009).   12
monetary sanction was determined by the seriousness of the violation, () XX − . Thus, 
we need proxies for these factors in order to perform the regressions explaining 
NSANCTION and LNFINE.  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
FINE  €15 210  €50 681  €275  €500 000 
LNFINE  8,37 1,33 5,62  13,12 
Dummy variable  Frequency 0  Frequency 1 
NSANCTION 138  37 
CLOSURE 153  22 
CLEANUP 157  18 
Table I: Summary statistics of dependent variables 
Firstly, it is hard to find data to measure the social costs of sanctions in an exact way. 
Therefore, we approximate the defendant’s economic importance by the total assets (in 
1000€) on its balance sheet at the end of the year before the judgment was made. The 
logarithmic transformation of this variable is called LNASSETS. Thus we can test 
hypothesis 1 and check whether larger firms have a smaller probability of being closed 
down than smaller firms, ceteris paribus. Secondly, we look at the seriousness of 
environmental damage caused by the violation. The variable COMMUNITY indicates 
whether the damages had a significant impact on the surrounding community. It takes a 
value of 1 if the offense had a negative impact on the health of a third party or on 
somebody's property, if public health was affected, if vulnerable areas were damaged or 
if living species were negatively affected. The dummy variable MULTIPLE takes a 
value of 1 if the defendant is being judged for offending several regulations in the same 
case. Summary statistics of these explanatory variables are provided in Table II. 
Next, to control for the characteristics of the violation, we introduce variables that 
reflect the type of environmental damage caused: problems with WASTE disposal, 
NOISE nuisance, SOIL, surface WATER and ODOR/AIR contamination. The reference 
category is given by offenses where no direct contamination was caused, or where no 
information on the type of contamination was available. We also indicate whether a 
POSITIVE action was taken by the defendant to limit environmental damages. The   13
defendant’s sector of activity is included as an additional control variable. We define 
sectoral dummies for firms active in the PRIMARY sector (i.e. mainly agriculture) and 
for firms active in the TERTIAIRY sector (i.e. services). In addition, we check whether 
the defendant has committed offenses previous to the current trial. If this is the case, the 
dummy variable HISTORY takes a value of 1.  
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
ASSETS (1000€)  €8 864  €29 236  €1  €319 000 
LNASSETS 6,77  2,33  0  12,67 
Dummy variable  Frequency 0 Frequency 1 
COMMUNITY 146  29 
MULTIPLE 62  113 
Table II: Summary statistics of most important explanatory variables 
Finally, we introduce time dummies (Y04, Y05 and Y06) to control for time trends in 
our database (reference year is 2003). We also use a regional control variable URBAN 
which equals 1 if the particular case is tried at the court of Ghent, the main urban area in 
our database. Table III summarizes the frequencies of the control variables.  
 








WASTE 117  58  PRIMARY  145  30 
NOISE 119  56  TERTIARY  111  64 
SOIL 154  21  HISTORY  165  10 
WATER 153  22  URBAN  104  71 
ODOR/AIR 151  24  Y04  144  31 
POSITIVE 121  54  Y05  126  49 
     Y06  117  58 
Table III: Summary table with frequency of occurrence of the control variables   14
3.2 Estimation method and expected results 
We first estimate
7 a probit model to explain the probability that a non-monetary 
sanction (NSANCTION) is imposed. Next, we estimate the factors determining the fine 
(LNFINE), once using OLS and once after introduction of an additional term (i.e. the 
inverse mills ratio) to control for sample selection bias
8. The fine levels are estimated 
separately for the cases with a non-monetary sanction and for the cases without non-
monetary sanction. The average fine imposed on defendants which do not receive a non-
monetary sanction is €12 166, with a standard deviation of 45 010. The average fine 
imposed on defendants which did receive a non-monetary sanction, in contrast, is equal 
to €24 082, with a standard deviation of 62 096. These different fine levels indicate that 
a selection bias might be present. If this bias can be explained by (some of the) 
observable explanatory variables, no correction through the additional term is necessary. 
If the selection is based on unobservable characteristics, however, we should include the 
Inverse Mills Ratio to control for the sample selection effect. We compare the estimated 
coefficients resulting from both approaches in Table V. The estimation of fine levels 
mainly focuses on firms that did not receive a non-monetary sanction, because the 
stringency of their total sanction is directly related to the imposed fine. For firms that 
faced a non-monetary sanction combined with a fine, the monetary sanction imposed is 
only one component of the total sanction. Thus, interpretation of the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the level of the total sanction is less straightforward. 
The empirical analysis can be used to comment on the two hypotheses related to the 
cost-efficiency of penalties and to their deterrence effect. If social costs of sanctions are 
taken into account, hypothesis 1 applies. We expect that the variable LNASSETS enters 
the estimated probit model with a negative coefficient, because closure of larger firms is 
costlier for society than that of smaller firms. In contrast, we expect a positive 
coefficient for LNASSET in the fine estimation, because larger firms operate on a larger 
scale and thus, for an equal marginal penalty, larger firms on average incur higher 
monetary fines. From the second hypothesis it follows that the variables COMMUNITY 
and MULTIPLE should have a positive effect both on the sanctioning probability and 
on the fine. In addition, a negative compliance HISTORY should lead to more stringent 
                                                 
7 All estimations are executed using the statistical software package LIMDEP. 
8 Following the approach proposed by Heckman (1979), we should include an additional term, called the 
inverse mills ratio, into the estimated linear models to obtain consistently estimated coefficients in the 
presence of sample selection bias.   15
sanctions since higher sanctions might be needed in order to make repeat offenders 
compliant. Since POSITIVE actions taken by offenders reduce the environmental 
damages, we expect less stringent penalties in these instances. 
3.3 Results 
First, we estimate a probit model to study the probability that a non-monetary sanction 
is imposed. Next, a linear model is estimated to identify the factors determining fines. 
3.3.1 Probability of non-monetary sanction 
Table IV presents the estimation of the probability that a non-monetary sanction is 
imposed. The results with NSANCTION as the dependent variable are given in the 
second column of Table IV. However, the non-monetary sanctions actually consist of 
firm closures (CLOSURE) as well as recovery requirements (CLEANUP). Therefore, 
we estimate two additional models with CLOSURE and CLEANUP as separate 
dependent variables. Due to the limited number of occurrences for these dependent 
variables, fewer explanatory variables are included. Thus, we see that the predictive 
power
9 of the first model exceeds that of the second or third model. 
 
Binomial Probit model: Y = PROB(Dep. Var.=1|X)  
# Obs = 175 
Dependent Variable  NSANCTION  CLOSURE  CLEANUP  Exp 
Constant -0,50  (0,61)  -0,63  (0,44)  -2,41 (0,70)***   
URBAN -0,06  (0,32)       
PRIMARY -0,14  (0,43)     
TERTIAIRY -0,51  (0,37)       
COMMUNITY  0,93 (0,39)**  0,69 (0,32)**  0,003 (0,58)  + 
HISTORY  0,24 (0,51)  0,40 (0,53)  -0,39 (0,72)  + 
MULTIPLE  0,35 (0,26)  0,37 (0,29)  0,45 (0,36)  + 
WASTE 0,89  (0,31)*** 0,33 (0,30)  1,68 (0,38)***   
NOISE -0,27  (0,48)       
SOIL -0,28  (0,45)       
                                                 
9 Note that the threshold level for predicting an outcome = 1 is set at 0,35 for the estimation of   
NSANCTION, in accordance with the low share (i.e. 21,4%) of occurrences for NSANCTION. For the 
other two models the threshold level is set at 0,3 in accordance with shares of 12,57% and 10,28%.   16
POSITIVE  -1,19 (0,35)*** -0,94 (0,39)**  -0,85 (0,39)**  - 
LNASSETS  -0,14 (0,07)** -0,13 (0,06)**  0,015 (0,08)  - 
Y04 0,40  (0,44)       
Y05 0,54  (0,40)       
Y06 0,67  (0,39)*      
% Correct predictions 
(benchmark: regression 
with a constant term only)  82,3% (78,9%) 86,3% (87,4%)     88% (89,7%) 
% Correct pred actual 0  90% (100%)  96% (100%)   92% (100%) 
% Correct pred actual 1  54% (0%)  18% (0%)  50% (0%) 
McFadden pseudo R²  0,23 0,13  0,29 
Estimated coefficients are given without brackets, standard errors between brackets  
* indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level 
Table IV: Output of the estimation of the non-monetary sanction probability  
We now discuss the estimated coefficients. First, we focus on the results of the 
regression for NSANCTION (second column, table IV). We investigate hypothesis 1 by 
looking at our proxy for the social costs of imposing a non-monetary sanction. Larger 
firms (LNASSETS) have a significantly lower probability of receiving a non-monetary 
sanction. More specifically, as indicated by the significant (5%) coefficient in the third 
column, we find that larger firms have a significantly lower probability of being 
(temporarily) closed down. Thus, the results provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that larger (or, economically more important) firms have a lower probability 
of being closed down as a sanction for an environmental offense compared to smaller 
firms. This result also indicates that judges take social costs of sanctions into account 
when deciding on the type of sanction and do not only focus on deterrence. Calculating 
the marginal effect
10 of LNASSETS, we find that a 1% increase in the size of the firm 
(expressed in 1000€) leads to an average decrease of 0,033 percentage points in the 
probability that a non-monetary sanction is imposed. This decrease may seem small, but 
given the wide range of firm assets, the size effect could lead to significant differences 
in the probability of receiving a non-monetary sanction in our database.  
To assess the magnitude of the size effect on the probability of imposing a non-
monetary sanction, we let the variable LNASSETS range from its minimum 0 to its 
maximum value 12,67, holding the other variables fixed at their means. The resulting 
probability of imposing a non-monetary sanction ranges from as high as 0,45 down to 
                                                 
10 The marginal effect of a variable represents the effect of a one unit increase in an explanatory variable 
on the dependent variable, evaluated at the mean of the other explanatory variables.   17
about 0,04. Thus, the level of firm ASSETS seems to be a significant component in the 
judicial decision to impose a non-monetary sanction. 
Next, we look at the variables representing the seriousness of the violation. We find that 
violations that caused noticeable damage to properties, health, or natural resources 
(COMMUNITY) have a significantly higher probability of receiving a non-monetary 
sanction. The significance of this community coefficient is mainly attributed to its 
impact on firm CLOSURE. When the offense had an impact on the surrounding 
community, the partial effect implies an increase in the probability of receiving a non-
monetary penalty by 28 percentage points. This result provides support for the second 
hypothesis, i.e. the likelihood of receiving a penalty is higher for cases where 
environmental damages are more important and/or where they are more visible since 
they affect the community. Therefore, HISTORY and MULTIPLE were also expected 
to have a positive impact on the sanctioning probability. Their estimated coefficients 
have the right (positive) sign, but they are not statistically significant. The non-
significance of HISTORY might indicate that the environmental characteristics of a 
violation are more important to induce a judge to impose a non-monetary sanction than 
the violator’s culpability. 
Furthermore, a POSITIVE action taken to mitigate environmental damages has a 
significantly negative effect on the probability of receiving a non-monetary sanction, be 
it a (temporary) firm closure or a mandatory cleanup requirement. The partial effect of 
this variable indicates a decrease in the probability of imposing a non-monetary 
sanction of 21 percentage points. We also find increases in non-monetary sanction 
probabilities over time, with a significant coefficient for Y2006. The sectorial dummies 
do not seem to influence the probability of receiving a non-monetary sanction. 
Finally, we find that WASTE-related violations have a significantly higher probability 
of receiving a non-monetary sanction, with a partial effect of 23 percentage points. This 
effect can mainly be attributed to the positive impact of a CLEANUP requirement on 
damages caused. This makes sense since illegal waste disposal naturally leads to clean 
up requirements, while this is less likely for other types of offenses. 
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3.3.2 The level of the fine 
After estimating the probability of imposing a non-monetary sanction, we turn to the 
regression of the level of the monetary sanction imposed. First, following the Heckman 
framework, the estimation of the dependent variable LNFINE is executed by adding the 
inverse mills ratio IMR as an additional explanatory variable to correct for a possible 
sample selection bias. LNFINE is estimated separately for the group of defendants that 
were fined without an additional non-monetary sanction and for those that were fined 
and also received a non-monetary sanction. As a robustness check and since the 
estimated coefficient of IMR is not significant, we also estimate a linear model without 
making the sample selection correction. The results are given in Table V.  
Linear model with LNFINE as the dependent variable 
#Obs   138  37  175 
Models 
Sample selection for 
NSANCTION = 0 
Sample selection for 
NSANCTION = 1  Linear model  Exp
Variable  Coef.  Coef.         Part. Effect  Coef.           
Constant  6,98 (0,49)***  3,97 (2,29)    6,66 (0,37)***   
URBAN  1,30 (0,19)***  1,09 (0,75)* 1,21 (0,97)  1,38 (0,19)***   
PRIMARY  0,27 (0,25)  1,04 (1,13)    0,36 (0,25)   
TERTIAIRY -0,29  (0,26)     -0,19  (0,22)   
COMMUNITY  0,16 (0,30)  1,96 (1,17)* 0,18 (1,81)  0,25 (0,25)  + 
HISTORY  -0,38 (0,39)  2,92 (1,22)** 2,46 (1,59)  0,53 (0,36)  + 
MULTIPLE  0,30 (0,19)  0,67 (0,78)    0,31 (0,17)*  + 
WASTE  0,10 (0,31)  2,36 (1,36)* 0,65 (1,85)  0,32 (0,20)   
NOISE  0,01 (0,23)      0,16 (0,24)   
SOIL  -0,41 (0,28)      -0,38 (0,27)   
POSITIVE   -0,78 (0,27)***  -2,21 (1,43)    -0,61 (0,18)***  - 
LNASSETS 0,15  (0,05)***  -0,07 (0,21)    0,15 (0,04)***  + 
Y04       -0,09  (0,26)   
Y05       0,24  (0,23)   
Y06       -0,36  (0,24)   
IMR  0,37 (0,64)  2,37 (1,53)     
Adj R²  0,40  0,532  0,392 
Estimated coefficients are given without brackets, standard errors in between brackets  
* indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level 
Table V: Output of the regression of the level of the sanction imposed    19
We first focus on the results of the sample selection models
11. For the group of 
defendants without non-monetary sanction, fines are significantly higher for firms 
located in urban surroundings (URBAN) and for larger firms (LNASSETS), while fines 
significantly decrease for firms that took positive mitigating actions (POSITIVE). As 
expected, taking a POSITIVE action to mitigate environmental damages makes the level 
of the fine decrease significantly (at 5% level). The partial effect
12 of POSITIVE 
indicates that firms that take positive actions can expect a 54% lower fine. The 
estimated effect of a 1% increase in the firm’s ASSETS is a 0,15% increase in the fine 
level. So it seems that larger firms, besides facing a marginal decrease in probability of 
being sanctioned non-monetarily, also face a considerable increase in the expected level 
of their fine. This increase might reflect that firms operating on a larger scale 
automatically cause larger environmental damages than smaller firms. So for the same 
per unit fine, they incur higher total fines. Finally, we found that expected fines imposed 
in an URBAN area (i.e. in the judicial district of Ghent) are, ceteris paribus, 267% 
higher than those imposed in other, more rural areas. Because we control for the 
community impact of offenses, for sectoral differences and for differences concerning 
the type of contamination, we believe that this effect can mainly be attributed to 
particular judicial objectives in the district of Ghent. It seems that the court in this area 
has a higher preference for environmental damage minimization and is less sensitive to 
the social costs of sanctions compared to other courts. In terms of our model, the results 
indicate that at the court of Ghent the parameter Ψ in the judicial objective function is 
closer to zero than at the other courts.  
In contrast to our expectations, offenders who were previously convicted (HISTORY) 
or were prosecuted for multiple violations (MULTIPLE) did not receive a higher fine 
for the group of defendants without a non-monetary sanction. However, HISTORY is 
significant for defendants that incurred a non-monetary sanction as well as a fine. So, 
repeat offenders who received a non-monetary sanction face higher fines. It could be 
that recidivism is interpreted as a signal of intentional non-compliance and that 
therefore more stringent sanctions as well as additional non-monetary sanctions are 
                                                 
11 The time effects were not significant in the sample selection models.  
12 We are looking at changes in dummy variables. Thus, the interpretation of a change in a logarithmic 
variable as a percentage change is no longer a good approximation since the partial changes for dummies 
(from 0 to 1) are large. Thus the partial effects are calculated as:  ( ) 100 1
COEF e −  (Wooldridge, 2006).   20
required if judges wish to make them comply. Offending MULTIPLE regulations has 
the correct (positive) sign in the sample selection models and is also statistically 
significant in the linear regression model. This indicates that multiple offenders might 
be punished more severely.  
In the sample selection model for offenders who were punished non-monetarily, we also 
find that URBAN and WASTE have a significantly positive effect on the level of the 
fine. The estimated partial effect of the variable WASTE, however, is not significant. So 
its significant coefficient should probably be attributed to the sampling effect. In the 
linear model, fines again increase with the size of the firm and for firms located in the 
city of Ghent and decrease when firms take remedial actions. Furthermore, fines are 
higher for MULTIPLE offenders. Thus, we can conclude that the significance of these 
three coefficients is quite robust over model specifications. 
3.4 Scenario exercise 
We now assess how the probability that a non-monetary sanction is imposed varies with 
economic importance of the firm, represented by his amount of ASSETS. We do this 
exercise for different combinations of the other variables that we identified as 
determinants for imposing a non-monetary sanction: COMMUNITY, WASTE and 
POSTIVE. Table VI provides an overview of the results. 
 
ASSETS  (in  1000€)  1000 2000 4000 8000 16000  32000 
COMMUNITY = 1 
WASTE = 1 
POSITIVE = 1 
0,354 0,319 0,286 0,255 0,225  0,198 
COMMUNITY = 1 
WASTE = 1 
POSITIVE = 0 
0,764 0,734 0,701 0,668 0,632  0,596 
COMMUNITY = 1 
WASTE = 0 
POSITIVE = 1 
0,091 0,076 0,064 0,053 0,043  0,035 
COMMUNITY = 0 
WASTE = 1 
POSITIVE = 1 
0,095 0,08  0,067 0,055 0,045  0,037 
Table VI Sensitivity analysis for non-monetary sanction probability with respect to firm assets   21
 
In the first two rows of Table VI we find that a 100% increase in ASSETS leads to a 
decrease in the non-monetary sanction probability which is not far from 3,3 percentage 
points. This is the equivalent to the marginal decrease of 0,033 for a 1% increase in 
ASSETS that we estimated in section 3.3.1. It is only when the non-monetary sanction 
probabilities are much lower, such as in the third and fourth row of Table VI, that the 
marginal effect of firm ASSETS on these probabilities become less important.  
3.5 Summary of the empirical analysis 
To summarize our empirical findings, we find support for the first and the second 
hypothesis formulated in section II. In support of the first hypothesis, larger firms are 
found to be closed down less frequently than smaller firms. This strengthens the view 
that courts balance the deterrence effect of sanctions on future violations with the social 
costs of using a particular sanction before reaching a verdict. So, in our illustration the 
case that  0 Ψ=  can be excluded. In support of the second hypothesis, violations that 
have a considerable impact on the community have a significantly higher chance of 
being penalized in a non-monetary way. Also, measures taken to limit environmental 
damages reduce the probability that a non-monetary sanction is imposed on the offender 
as well as the level of the imposed fine. Furthermore, offenders with a negative 
compliance history seem to incur significantly higher fines if they simultaneously 
received a non-monetary sanction. These findings support the view that environmental 
damages, and thus the seriousness of the violations, are indeed important drivers of the 
stringency of sanctions. 
From our results, it seems that intentionality of defendants, as signaled through their 
compliance history and their willingness to take actions to mitigate damages, is an 
important determinant of the level of the penalty. In contrast, the decision to impose a 
non-monetary sanction is influenced by the consequences of a violation such as the 
impact on the community. In our case, the multiplicity of committed violations does not 
look like a very important component, although we found some evidence that offenders 
of multiple regulations face higher penalties. Possibly, judges prefer to focus on the 
intentionality of the offense and on the most serious of the different violations rather 
than the number of violated regulations. Finally, the empirical analysis also indicates 
that judges at the court in Ghent, the main urban area in our dataset, are more averse to   22
firms imposing environmental damages on society and are less concerned by the social 
costs of sanctions than the judges at other Flemish courts in our dataset. 
IV. Conclusion 
Our principal objective was to investigate whether judges balance environmental costs 
with social costs of sanctions when making their judgments or whether they solely focus 
on deterrence. Indeed, we observe that the economic and the judicial view on regulatory 
enforcement may lead to different objectives and therefore to different enforcement 
strategies. First, we developed a theoretical model to analyze judicial objectives subject 
to firm behavior. We solve the model under two benchmark scenarios for the judge’s 
objectives corresponding to a judge behaving as a social welfare maximizer and to a 
judge maximizing deterrence for committing environmental offenses. We observe that a 
welfare maximizing judge has a rationale for imposing (temporary) closure as a sanction 
when firms are wealth constrained. In addition, we found that the less important the 
judge deems the social costs of sanctions, the more often these sanctions will be 
imposed. To enhance the realism of this model, a multi-period model could be 
developed to introduce the possibility of penalty leverage if infringements occur 
repeatedly at the same firm. Another extension could be to introduce settlement 
mechanisms and measurement errors into the model. 
From the empirical analysis, we learned that social costs of sanctions and the extent of 
environmental damages are both elements taken into consideration when deciding on 
the penalty to impose. We observe that larger firms are closed down significantly less 
often than smaller firms. In addition, we found an indication that judicial objectives at 
the court in Ghent are more inclined towards preventing environmental damage, in 
comparison with other courts in the dataset. A possible extension could be to use more 
specific data on the environmental costs of violations and on the social costs of 
sanctions in order to analyze more precisely the extent to which both elements are taken 
into account by judges.  
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